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ASSESSING ADMINISTRATION CHARGES FOR THE 
AFFILIATE IN INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT SYSTEMS 
 
José E. Devesa-Carpio, Rosa Rodríguez-Barrera and Carlos Vidal-Meliá 
   
A B S T R A C T 
In any pension system based on capitalization, affiliates have to cover certain explicit 
costs which in a pay-as-you-go system would be implicit. In this paper we set out a model 
based on Whitehouse (2000) and Diamond (1999) to enable the explicit costs borne by the 
affiliate both during his working life and his retirement period to be assessed. It also shows 
the relationships between the different ways of measuring the costs that make up the total 
price finally paid by the contributors. Included in the model is the notable effect that some 
factors - such as gaps in contribution profiles, account transfers and changes in salary profiles 
- have on projecting the costs borne by the affiliates.  
Finally we carry out an international comparison of administration costs from the point 
of view of the affiliate, focusing special attention on the countries of Latin America and 
Spain. This has a double objective: 
1.-To test the validity of criticisms made by some researchers as to whether the new 
capitalization systems introduced in Latin America are too expensive to run for the affiliates. 
2.-To serve as a reference for the individual pension scheme system in Spain. 
 
JEL Classification: G23, H55, J26. 




R E S U M E N 
 
En un sistema de pensiones basado en la capitalización los afiliados deben hacer frente 
a unos costes explícitos que en el sistema de reparto son implícitos. En este trabajo se 
desarrolla un modelo, basado en Whitehouse (2000) y Diamond (1999), que permite evaluar 
las comisiones explícitas que soporta el afiliado, tanto durante la vida laboral como durante la 
etapa de jubilación y que, además, muestra la relación entre las diferentes medidas de los 
costes que integran el precio total que finalmente pagan los cotizantes. En el modelo se 
introduce el efecto de algunos aspectos que tienen una repercusión muy importante en la 
proyección de los costes que soportan los afiliados: “vacíos” en los perfiles de aportación, 
efecto de los traspasos de fondos y cambio en los perfiles de salarios. Por último, se realiza 
una comparación internacional de los costes de administración desde la óptica de los afiliados 
con un doble objetivo: 
1.-Contrastar la validez de la crítica realizada por algunos investigadores a los nuevos 
sistemas de capitalización individual implantados en América Latina, en el sentido de que son 
excesivamente caros de gestionar para los afiliados. 
2.-Servir de referencia para el sistema de planes de pensiones individuales en España. 
 
Clasificación JEL: G23, H55, J26.  




Over the last few years there has been much debate regarding the nature, viability and 
scope of public pension systems which has ended up by undermining political support for the 
more traditional forms of pension provision. It has set in motion an unprecendented process of 
reforms inspired by the approach of the World Bank, according to Holzmann (2000), which 
for the second pillar recommends capitalization, defined contributions and private 
management. Naturally enough, not all researchers agree with the predominant profile or bias 
of the reform. Included amongst the better-known critics are Orszag and Stiglitz (1999) and 
Barr (2000), for example, although as Queisser (2000) points out, while discussion of the 
reforms initially took the form of a heated debate with a noticeable ideological bias, now all 
the participants are seeking mutual understanding and, more specifically, a greater level of 
coordination and cooperation. 
According to Devesa, Martínez and Vidal (2000), many countries in Latin America 
have partially or totally transformed their pensions systems into individual capitalization 
systems in which the ideas of individual responsibility and freedom of choice take on greater 
importance. Chile pioneered the reforms in 1981 and is perhaps the country which has put 
them into practice in the most drastic way due to its own particular political conditions. Peru 
(1993), Colombia (1993), Argentina (1994), Uruguay (1995), Mexico (1995), Costa Rica 
(1995), Bolivia (1997) and El Salvador (1998) also carried out reforms at a later date, these 
last two countries being those which most resemble the pioneer model. Other countries in the 
region - Nicaragua, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic - are currently in the process of 
carrying out reforms based on individual capitalization accounts. 
  The pensions systems in all these countries -most of which were pay-as-you-go, 
although previously they had been collective capitalization- collapsed for various reasons: 
serious economic problems, evident design flaws, a general lack of trust in politicians, the 
inability of the State to administer the public systems, the low level of coverage, unfair 
differences between contributors, regressivity in the distribution of income, bad management 
of existing funds and high administration costs
1.  
                                                 
1 Rodríguez and Durán (2000) argue that the fact that in some Latin American countries, pre-reform 
administration costs on an absolute level reached an amount similar to the benefits paid, leads one to conclude 
that the excessive costs in the public pay-as-you-go systems were due to the solvency crisis, which in many cases 
preceded the reform, almost as much as to demographic factors or the design of the benefits. On average, the 
proportion represented by administration fees in relation to benefits paid was ten times higher than it was in 
OECD countries.  
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Administration costs are currently attracting the interest of various researchers for a 
number of reasons: 
a)  Many countries have set up or are considering setting up some sort of system of 
individual capitalization accounts.  
b)  Measuring the cost of financial services is much more difficult than measuring the 
cost of other goods and services. 
c)  The cost is often not transparent and affects different contributors in different ways 
according to their level of income and the amount they have accumulated in the 
funds. 
d)  Charges which are too high:  
1.-Discourage affiliates from participating and reduce the real return on capitalization 
accounts, thereby making it impossible to fulfil one of the basic objectives of the reform. 
2.-According to Mitchell (1999), they increase future costs for the State due to the fact 
that some countries guarantee a minimum retirement pension. Higher administration costs 
generate a greater number of people who will need to have their pensions supplemented. 
These arguments would appear to justify State intervention in the interests of 
maintaining administration costs at a reasonable level, at least in mandatory capitalization 
systems. In voluntary systems, the argument for intervention in this sense is not as strong. 
However, as will be seen later, it does appear to be justified in the case of Spain. 
It is not our intention in this paper to try and analyse the costs structure of the pension 
fund administration industry, as Valdés-Prieto (1999) and Mastrángelo (1999) and others have 
done in detail. Neither is it our intention to compare costs between different systems, as 
Mitchell (1998) has done, nor to compare costs with other forms of private industry or to find 
the most effective way of organizing a capitalization system, as shown in papers by James, 
Ferrier, Smalhout and Vittas (1999), Thompson (1999) and Rodríguez and Durán (2000).  
This paper does have a connection with those mentioned above, and in some aspects is 
supported by them, but it takes a different approach as it is carried out from the point of view 
of the individual. Its structure is as follows. After this brief introduction, the next section 
analyzes the basic charges that affiliates usually have to pay in capitalization systems. A 
model based on Whitehouse (2000) and Diamond (1999) is then set out so as to enable the  
explicit costs borne by the affiliate both during his working life and his retirement period to 
be assessed. The model also shows the relationship between the different ways of measuring  
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those costs which make up the total amount the contributors eventually pay. The fourth 
section analyzes, mainly, the two measurements most used in the literature:  
 a´1 : combines the effect of all the explicit fees as a whole into a single constant 
percentage which decreases the total amount of all the contributions. 
 a´2 : combines the effect of all the explicit fees as a whole into a constant decrease in 
gross return. 
It also looks at some factors which are not usually given much importance in the 
literature but which undoubtedly have a great effect on projecting the costs borne by affiliates 
during their entire period as contributors/pensioners, namely: gaps in contribution profiles, the 
effect of account transfers, and changes in salary profiles. In the fifth section an international 
comparison is made of administration costs from the point of view of the contributor. This has 
a double objective: 
1.-To test the validity of criticisms made by some researchers as to whether the new 
capitalization systems introduced in Latin America are too expensive to run for the affiliates. 
2.-To serve as a reference for the individual pension scheme system in Spain.  
The paper ends with the main conclusions reached and a full bibliography. Finally 
there are various appendices where questions relating to the determination of the fund values 
and salary functions used in the various comparisons are dealt with in detail. 
2.  BASIC EXPLICIT CHARGES FOR INDIVIDUAL 
CAPITALIZATION ACCOUNTS. 
In any pensions system based on capitalization, affiliates have to cover explicit costs 
(which in a pay-as-you-go system are implicit) both throughout their working life and during 
their retirement period. In the case of workers, the costs take the form of fees paid to the 
administrators of the system, while for pensioners the cost will depend on the type of pension 
chosen. It is clear that the way a capitalization system is organized will have a great impact on 
costs, and that a system of decentralized individual accounts will always have a higher level 
of costs than other types of capitalization accounts.  
The explicit charge structure adopted by any accumulation system is very important 
due to its long-term character and the fact that the fund accumulation process is exponential. 
In general terms the charges can be categorized as follows:   
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a) By  amount: 
•  Fixed. This generates a relatively higher cost for workers on low incomes.  
•  Variable. This usually covers two types of services: managing the balance in 
the individual account and collecting contributions. 
 
b)  By frequency of payments: 
•  One-off charges. These usually apply in three cases: to open the individual 
capitalization account, to transfer the funds accumulated to another scheme, or 
to convert the assets accumulated into a pension. 
•  Periodic charges. These cover the costs of management, custody and deposit, 
and may be paid in advance or in arrears. 
•  Ongoing charges. These are payable up-front periodically. 
  
c)  By the amount on which they are levied: 
•  On the balance. 
•  On the contribution. 
•  On the nominal value of the portfolio. 
A suitable combination of these charges or explicit costs would increase coverage and 
enable some of the costs of the system to be distributed proportionally according to the 
affiliates' level of income. Whatever charge structure is adopted will have a great impact on 
the payments the contributor has to make over time, although in the long term they can work 
out to be equivalent. In support of these claims, Graph 1 shows the time profile for three 
different types of charges payable by the affiliate. For simplicity's sake it is assumed that each 
of them is for a single charge type: 
1.- As a percentage of contributions (without lower limit). 
2.- As a percentage of the assets in the accumulated fund (without lower limit). 






The first charge structure proposed means that the affiliate has to pay more at the start. 
This would not be very positive from the point of view of possibly increasing the system's 
coverage and would work against affiliates on lower incomes. From the point of view of the 
administrators, however, it would be very positive since they could recoup the system's initial 
set-up costs more quickly. The structure would not always work against the affiliate as those 
who may not be able to make contributions over certain periods would have zero-cost fund 
management.  
The second charge structure, unlike the first, means that the affiliate pays less at the 
start. However, the amount payable increases considerably as the fund accumulates. Whether 
or not new contributions are made, the affiliate always has to pay charges, and the amount of 
these charges gets bigger and bigger over time. This structure could be the most suitable from 
the point of view of possibly extending coverage.  
Graph 1
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Both these charge structures could imply cross-subsidies between affiliates. Assuming 
that managing the individual capitalization account has a fixed cost for the administrator, and 
given that there is no minimum fee, the first structure would mean that affiliates on higher 
incomes would subsidize those on lower incomes, while in the second structure it would be 
the older affiliates with substantially larger funds who would be subsidizing younger 
affiliates. The third structure, being a combination of the two previous ones, could soften the 
effects mentioned above.  
The concept of “explicit costs” should be clarified here since substantial implicit costs 
could arise which are not included in the model in Section 3. They are also very difficult to 
assess in practice. According to Valdés-Prieto (1999), interest groups in some countries, 
including those forming part of the political system, can influence the pensions system in 
various different ways. The easiest way to measure this “influence” is by looking at the effect 
it has on the return of the investments. A decrease in the return is equivalent to an implicit tax 
charged by the pressure groups on the pension fund. The cost of political influence on the 
pensions system can be measured as the difference between the return reached in that 
particular country at that particular time by other big long-term investors and the return 
actually reached by the pension fund in question.  
Iglesias and Palacios (2000) find empirical evidence that capitalized funds managed 
by the public sector are often used for purposes other than those intended, that they are very 
difficult to protect from political interference, and that they tend to produce returns far below 
reference rates. This evidence is consistent and particularly relevant in countries with weak 
democratic structures. Valdés-Prieto (1999) calls this effect the cost of not privatizing.   
Another implicit cost for the affiliate may be found by comparing the implicit return of 
the pay-as-you-go system with the net return of the capitalization system in those countries 
where it is possible to choose between systems. In a financially balanced pay-as-you-go 
system, the implicit internal rate promised by the system, as shown by Devesa, Lejárraga and 
Vidal (2000), is approximately equal to the rate of growth of the contributing population plus 
the real growth rate of salaries which, under certain conditions, could be assimilated into the 
real growth of the gross domestic product. Therefore net returns below what the financially 
balanced pay-as-you-go system is in theory capable of producing can be considered as another 
cost for the affiliate. 
Finally it should be mentioned that, as Whitehouse (2000) points out, measuring the 
cost of financial services is a complex task since different systems have very different charges 
and regulations:   
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a)  Restrictions on charges do not usually exist or, if they do, they are very limited. 
This tends to be the case in countries where private pension schemes (or individual 
capitalization accounts) are voluntary or have been built upon already existing 
voluntary systems. Hence in Spain for example, the administration costs that fund 
managers and deposit takers can charge are limited to a maximum of 2.6% of the 
annual assets managed/deposited.  
b) "Subsidies" to workers on low incomes. The State, either directly or through 
special taxes on workers with higher incomes, contributes a fixed percentage of 
salary to the individual accounts of workers on low incomes. This is the case in 
Colombia and Mexico. Workers on low incomes are also usually allowed to remain 
outside the system, as is the case in Uruguay. 
c)  Limitation of the charges structure and/or setting partial (fixed or variable) ceilings 
on charges in such a way that pension fund managers can only levy a certain 
number of charges, and these only under certain conditions. For example: 
1)  They may have to choose between a fixed or variable charge. 
2)  They may have to choose between a contributions-based charge and an 
assets-based charge. 
3)  They may be allowed to apply only two types of charges, but one of them 
may have a ceiling while the other may be unrestricted. 
d)  Multiple and/or competitive portfolios are offered to tender. In other words, the 
different pension fund managers may have to bid for the right to manage the funds 
accumulated by members of the scheme. This is the procedure applied in the 
capitalization part of the new Swedish system, and also in Bolivia. 
3.  MODEL FOR MEASURING CHARGES FROM THE POINT OF 
VIEW OF THE CONTRIBUTOR/PENSIONER. 
In this section a model will be set up based on the ideas of Whitehouse (2000) and 
Diamond (1999) to show the relationship between the different ways of measuring the costs 
that make up the total price that contributors eventually have to pay. This will enable the 
explicit costs (implicit costs will not be considered here) borne by the affiliate both during his 
working life and his retirement period to be assessed. This analysis is therefore an important 
prerequisite for the comparison of different charge structures.  
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The elements considered are: 
wt:   salaries at time t. 
g:   real, annual, accumulative growth rate of salaries. 
c:   percentage of salary contributed to the pension scheme. 
r:   real, gross, annual, accumulated return obtained by the fund. 
a0:   single fixed charge, payable at the start. 
a1:   percentage applied on each contribution, giving rise to a periodic charge.  
a2:   percentage applied instantaneously on the assets accumulated, giving rise to an 
ongoing charge. 
a3:   percentage applied on the accumulated balance, payable for transferring the 
account to another scheme. 
a4:    percentage applied on the accumulated balance, payable for converting the 
accumulated fund into a pension. 
An individual's salary wt in a given period t, assuming real exponential growth at rate 
g, in accordance with salaries for period 0, can be expressed in the following way: 
 
gt
t e w w 0 =   [1.] 
Contribution to the pension fund at time t, net of the periodic charge on contributions 
(a1), will be shown as: 
 
gt e w a c 0 1) 1 ( −   [2.] 
The net amount accumulated in the fund, corresponding to the contribution made at 
time t and assessed at retirement time T, is given by the formula: 
  
) (
0 1) 1 (
t T r gte e w a c
− −    [3.] 
  If ongoing charge (a2) is added, the accumulated amount corresponding to the 
contribution made at time t and assessed at retirement time T will grow according to the 




2 ) 1 (
t T a r gte e w a c
− − −    [4.]  
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By integrating the above expression, see Appendix 1, from moment 0 (the start of the 
plan) up to time T (when the accumulated funds are withdrawn), the following total amount 
accumulated is obtained: 
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   [5.] 
Any single charge payable in advance (a0) will imply a decrease in the net return of the 
investment, which would translate into a reduction in pension, at time T, of: 
 
T a r e a
) (
0
2 −   [6.] 
If the charge for converting the accumulated fund (a4) into an pension(income) is 
considered, the total net amount accumulated in an individual capitalization system (IAc) will 
take on the following expression: 
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which is the final value that should be reached by the individual capitalization account after 
deducting all charges and costs, and assuming that the account has not been transferred at any 
time during the contribution period.  
The experience of the countries of Latin America shows that this last assumption is far 
from realistic. The contributor tends to move his account from one fund to another during his 
working life. If we assume that a percentage a3
i is charged on the accumulated fund as a fee 
for each change of fund, and that in addition “s” changes of fund are made every “T/(s+1)” 
years, the net total accumulated will be (see Appendix 2): 
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  [8.] 
Another effect that can easily be studied is the gap in contributions. It often happens 
that some people are unable to contribute for a number of years due to unemployment or 
because they work in the informal sector of the economy or need to care for relatives, etc. 
During these years without contributions, charges are still made on funds, although charges 
on contributions are obviously nil. For simplicity's sake assume that the worker makes  
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contributions to the scheme up to time N, which is when contributions cease, although the 
funds remain invested until time T (which is when he begins to receive the pension). 
At the time when the contributions cease, the accumulated fund, net of charges on 
contributions and assets (a1  and  a2 respectively), is given by equation (5) simply by 
substituting N for T: 
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   [9.] 
After N, the time when contributions cease, the fund continues to grow because of the 
return, net of charges, obtaining an accumulated total of: 
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  [10.] 
To sum up, the above equations supply the net value of the fund when considering five 
different specific charges: one fixed and payable in advance (a0); one on contributions (a1); 
one instantaneous on the assets in the fund (a2); one which penalizes anyone leaving the 
scheme, which is equivalent to a percentage on the accumulated balance at each time (a3) and 
which can be applied “s” number of times; and finally a one-off charge paid by the worker 
when the accumulated fund is converted into a pension(a4). 
So as later to be able to assess the impact of the charges, we are going to use the 
amount that would have accumulated in the absence of any charges (IAnc), reducing all the as 









   
0     [11.] 
This simple analytical model enables us to measure the impact of administration costs 
in various ways: 
A)   As a reduction in gross return. It tranfers the total effect of all the charges to a constant 
annual decrease in gross return. It is assumed that the gross return, the time profile of the 
contributions and the length of the schemeare known. It can be interpreted as the equivalent 
fee that, applied as a constant instantaneous charge on the accumulated fund, supplies the 
same final amount that would be obtained if all the charges were taken into account. It is  
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calculated by obtaining a´2 of the equation resulting from equalling value IAC of expression 
(7)














   [12.] 
B)  As a reduction in contributions. It transfers the total effect of all the charges to a single 
constant percentage, a´1, which would decrease the amount of all the contributions paid. It is 
assumed that the gross return, the time profile of the contributions and the length of the 
schemeare known. It can be interpreted as the equivalent fee that, applied as a constant 
percentage of contributions, supplies the same final amount that would be obtained if all the 
charges were taken into account. It is calculated by finding the value of a’1 of the equation 
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- 1     ' = a   [14.] 
or in other words the complement of the unit of the quotient  between the total amount 
accumulated in the fund, once fees are deducted, and the amount accumulated in the case of 
there being no fees.  
C)  As a reduction in the amount of the accumulated fund. This measures the proportion of 
the final balance in an individual capitalization account which is absorbed by charges. It can 
be interpreted as the equivalent charges that, applied to the amount in the accumulated fund at 
the time of retirement, supply the same final amount that would be obtained if all the charges 
were taken into account. It is calculated by finding the value of a’4 of the equation obtained 
by equalling value IAC of expression (7) and the following equation: 







  [15.] 
reaching the same formula as in case B), whereby: 
                                                 
2 The comparison can also be made by using equations (8) and (10).  
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   CR     '   ' 4 1 = = a a    [16.] 
where CR stands for charge ratio, as introduced by Diamond (1999). This must be between 0 
and 1, as the theoretical value of the fund once the charges have been deducted cannot be 
more than the value it would reach without taking those charges into consideration. Neither 
can it be equal to or less than zero. Therefore high costs associated with individual 
capitalization accounts correspond to high CR values. It can take on the extreme values of the 
interval in the following cases: 
CR = 0  if no charge of any type exists. This is a situation which in practice never 
comes about and is purely academic. 
CR = 1  if the amount of the charges is so high that it completely absorbs the value 
of the accumulated fund. 
Murthi, Orszag and Orszag (1999) give another view of the CR, which they break up 
into three components: 





c × × − = − = 1 1   [17.] 
1.  The accumulation ratio (RAC): this includes the decreases brought about by the costs 
(of administration, management, etc.) incurred by the worker when making 
contributions to the individual account during working life, assuming that the 
contributions are made regularly and to a single pension fund. 
2.  The alteration ratio (RAL): this measures the costs arising from not contributing 
regularly to a single pension fund, in other words the costs incurred by the participant 
during his working life arising from: 
-  transferring the amount accumulated to another account, and the 
contributions made at a later date to another alternative fund 
(transferred account). 
-  maintaining the accumulated amount in the original fund, but 
paying new contributions into alternative funds . 
-  maintaining the accumulated amount in the original fund, but 
without making any more contributions.  
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3. The annualization ratio (RAN): this shows the costs involved when converting the 
accumulated fund into an annuity, programmed withdrawal, etc.. 
4.  ANALYSIS OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE CHARGE 
MEASURES AND VARIATION IN SOME ASSUMPTIONS.  
The various charge measures can be analyzed by calculating the value of IAC by way 
of equation (7) for different charges. The baseline assumptions are that salaries are 1 
monetary unit; the real, annual, accumulative growth rate of individual salaries is 3%; the 
accumulative annual return on the investments is 5%; and the contributions are made over 
periods of 40, 30 and 20 years. 
Graph 2 shows the relationship between the charges on the assets accumulated by the 
contributor,  a2, and the charges on contributions, a´1, assuming the rest to be zero. The 
horizontal axis represents a2, with assigned values between 0% and 3%, and the vertical axis 
shows the equivalent charge, a´1, that would have to be levied on the contributions in order to 
obtain the same final pension value. Graph 2 shows that some relatively low charges levied on 
assets can substantially reduce the value of the pension. For example, a value of a2 equal to 
1% is equivalent to a reduction of approximately 20% of the contributions (or 20% of the 
final pension value) with forty years of contributions. The relation between both measures is 
almost linear. Also, given a level of profit growth and a real return, whichever way of 
measuring the charges is chosen, no great differences will show up when comparing 
individual schemes or systems in different countries with different charge levels. In other 
words: 
-  Doubling the value of a2, for example, increasing it from 0.5% to 
1% anually, would bring about an increase in a´1 of approximately 
90%. 
-  A similar reduction in a´1 is brought about if the value of a2 is 




Graph 3 shows the relation between gross return r and a´1, assuming that a2 is equal to 
1% and considering the other charges to be zero. It can be seen that an increase of one 
percentage point in the rate of return brings about an increase of approximately one 
percentage point in the value of a´1. This is due to the fact that an increase in the amount of 
the accumulated fund has to be compensated for by a greater increase in the charges that have 
to be paid on the contributions (see the relation between a2 and a´1). 
Graph 4 shows the total amount of the accumulated funds with charges IAC, and 
without charges IANC, with a2 being equal to 1%, T equal to 40 years, and with various values 
for the return. It can be seen that due to the accumulative effect, after taking the charges into 
consideration the funds have a more gradual upward curve. The area between the two curves 
would be the arithmetical sum of the charges levied. 
Graph 2
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The effect of changes in the real accumulative growth of salaries on the value of a´1, 
with a2 being equal to 1%, can be seen in Graph 5. For T= 40, a one point increase in the real 
growth of salaries implies a decrease in the value of a´1 of almost one percentage point. Hence 
for example, for g=3%, a´1 is approximately 20%, whereas if it is assumed that g=6%, a´1 is 
16%. This can be explained by the fact that, although the amount in the accumulated fund has 
increased, the effect comes about as a result of an increase in the amounts contributed. 
 
 
Graphs 6 and 7 show that measuring costs by way of a´2 is very sensitive to changes in 
assumptions as to what return will be reached and as to the accumulative growth rate of 
salaries. A higher return, see Graph 5, will reduce the percentage of charges levied on the 
fund, although the total charge actually paid would remain constant. If Graph 6 is compared 
with Graph 3 the opposite case is true. Increases in the growth rate of salaries, Graph 7, bring 
about an increase not only in the charges levied on the fund but also in the charges actually 
paid. 
Graph 5
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So far the only case considered has been that of an individual contributing over a 40-
year period. What would happen if the contribution period were less than 40 years, assuming 
that the individual withdraws what he has accumulated when he stops contributing? This is 
shown in Graph 8, which relates a´1 to the time period, with a2 being equal to 1%. It can be 
seen that a´1 increases in an almost straight line with respect to the increase in time, 
approximately 0.5 percentage points for each additional year. This happens because in the 
short term most of the assets accumulated come from contributions, whereas over the long 
term the relative weight of interest increases vis-à-vis that of contributions. 
Graph 8













In Graph 9 a´2 (charges on the amount in the fund) relates to the time period, 
considering a fixed charge, a1, of 20% of contributions. There is an inverse relation between 
both amounts. The relation seen is not linear and, in addition, it gives the opposite effect from 
what was shown in Graph 8 in such a way that it is the longer-term schemes that appear to be 
cheaper, although the absolute value of the costs increases. The longer the scheme, the more 
years there are over which to distribute the charges on contributions, which implies that its 





4.1.  Gaps in contribution profiles. 
Graph 10 shows how gaps in making contributions have an effect on average charges 
as a percentage of contributions or, in other words, on the total accumulated in the pension 
fund. For a2 being equal to 1%, and with N=40, a´1 is approximately 20%. In the middle of 
the curve, where it is assumed that the worker has contributed for 20 years and stops making 
contributions to the fund for another twenty years, and with the same a2, the value of a´1 is 
now 26%.  
Then again, the opposite effect can be seen in Graph 11. For a1 being equal to 20%, 
and with N=40, a´2 is approximately 1%. However, if contributions are only made for 20 
years, then a´2 is approximately 0.7% and appears to be cheaper. 
Graph 9

































4.2.  Effect of account transfers on costs. 
Changing funds causes a noticeable increase in the administration costs to be borne by 
the affiliate throughout his working life. Therefore it only makes sense to do so if the 
expected increased return of the new fund is likely to compensate for the transfer charge paid, 
or should it be a case of participants close to retirement age who are seeking funds with safer 
portfolios. The possibility of measuring this effect via the charges defined as a3 has already 
been introduced in the model set out above. With this end in view see Graphs 12 and 13, 
which are copies of Graphs 8 and 9 but with the effect of the transfers added in, albeit in an 
exaggerated form to make it easier to see. 
In Graph 12, assuming that the return is the same in both funds, that there is a change 
of fund every 8 years, and with the value of a2 equal to 1%, the line is superimposed over the 
line from Graph 8 until the seventh year, then in the eighth year there is a sharp increase in the 
value of a´1 due to the inclusion of the account transfer charge. From the ninth year until the 
fifteenth the two curves get closer to each other, then in the sixteenth there is another sharp 
increase denoting the new change of fund. The same dynamics follow through successive 
periods. Maintaining the same assumptions, again in Graph 13 a situation comes about that is 
symmetrical to that shown in Graph 12, but with respect to Graph 9. 
Graph 12
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As mentioned earlier, transferring to another fund should only be considered if the net 
return of the new fund is greater than that of the old one. It would appear, therefore, that the 
best way of calculating the cost is by determining the equivalent value of a2, as this would 
enable the net return expected from the new fund to be deduced easily from historic 
information and from future expectations of gross return. 
4.3.  Changes in salary profiles. 
Until now it has been assumed that real salaries have grown at annual accumulative 
rate g. Although this assumption is valid for the nominal growth of salaries, it does not appear 
to be the most suitable method when real salaries are being calculated. Nevertheless, it is the 
method most used in the literature because it is simple to operate and calculate. In this 
subsection we will try to analyse the impact of the use of different salary  functions on  
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measuring administration costs. Two functions will be taken as references: the Gaussian
3 and 
the Carriere-Shand. The salary profiles compared are shown along with the profile of the 
exponential function of constant growth in Graph 14. It should be pointed out that both these 
functions respond much more to the average real behaviour of employed and self-employed 
workers than the exponential function of constant growth does. 
 
 
Graph 15 shows the relationship between charges levied on the assets accumulated by 
the contributor, a2, and charges on contributions, a´1, assuming all others to be zero. The 
horizontal axis represents a2, which has been assigned values of between 0% and 3.6%. The 
vertical axis shows the equivalent charge, a´1, that would have to be levied on contributions in 
order to obtain the same final pension value. As can be seen, the salary function used has an 
influence on the equivalent charge, a´1. For the data used (r =5%, T=40 years, equal actual 
values for salaries in all three profiles, which means that the value reached by the fund 
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without charges is the same in all three cases), the salary function supplying the lowest charge 
is the exponential function of constant growth, followed by the Gaussian function, and finally 
the Carriere-Shand. This is logical since, as the reference charge is levied on average assets 
and it is assumed that the percentage of contribution remains constant throughout working 
life, the equivalent charge, a´1, will be greater in whichever function provides less average 
assets invested in the capitalization account. This, given its functional form, is the exponential 
function.  
Graph 15













Graph 16 shows the relation between charges on contributions, a1, and charges on the 
assets accumulated by the contributor, a´2, assuming the rest to be zero. The horizontal axis 
represents a1, which has been assigned values between 0% and 36%, while the vertical axis 
shows the equivalent charge, a´2, that would have to be levied on the assets accumulated in 
the fund by the contributor in order to obtain the same final pension value. In this case the 
exponential function of constant growth is penalized for precisely the same reason as was 
mentioned in the paragraph above. According to Graph 16, it appears to be the most 
expensive function since it provides a higher value of equivalent charges on the assets than 
the other two functions used. It is therefore clear that most papers that obtain this equivalent  
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measure by working with charge structures based on a1, as is the case for most countries in 
Latin America, overvalue it by using the constant exponential function. 
 
 
5. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF CHARGES ON 
INDIVIDUAL CAPITALIZATION ACCOUNTS. 
Using the theoretical structure set out above, this section contains an international 
comparison of charges for affiliates, with special attention focused on the countries of Latin 
America. In principle it is hoped that this will achieve a double objective: 
1.- To test the validity of criticisms made by some researchers as to whether the new 
capitalization systems introduced in Latin America are too expensive to run for the 
affiliates. 
Graph 16
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2.- To serve as a reference for the individual pension schemesystem in Spain.  
The international comparison concentrates on what are known as individual schemes. 
Judging by the experience of countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain, Australia and the 
United States, these are always much more expensive for the affiliate than company or 
collective schemes. It is logical that these latter schemes be excluded from the comparison 
because the area of study is the countries of Latin America, and the systems in those countries 
are built up around individual capitalization accounts, which are the most similar to individual 
pension schemes. 
5.1.  Charges in the countries of Latin America. 
As far as the countries of Latin America are concerned there is a wide range of charge 
structures, as can be seen from Table 1: 
 
Table 1. 
Charge structure in the countries of Latin America 
 
Variable charge. 









Bolivia YES  YES  NO  NO 
Chile NO  YES  YES  NO 
Colombia  NO YES NO  NO 
Spain YES  NO  NO  NO 
El  Salvador  NO YES NO  NO 
Mexico  YES YES YES 
YES 
Loyalty 
Peru  NO YES NO  NO 
Uruguay  NO YES NO  NO 
 
Source: Devesa and Vidal (2001). 
 
•  Charges are levied on contributions in all the countries analyzed. 
•  Charges are also levied on the balance in the fund in Bolivia and Mexico.  
30
•  Fixed charges are levied only in Chile and Mexico.  
•  In Mexico the possibility of giving discounts on charges when the contributor 
keeps his account with the same administrator for a certain agreed length of 
time is being considered. In Argentina, as well as the loyalty discount, there are 
also fulfilment discounts when certain other requirements are met. 
•  The authorized charge structure in Spain is quite different from that in Latin 
American countries. Charges can only be levied on the amount 
managed/deposited.  
Care should be taken when comparing charges in these countries because they are not 
applied in the same way: 
•  In some countries charges are levied on the maximum compulsory 
contribution, while in others they are levied on the gross contribution. For this 
reason Table 2 includes a column to show the capitalizable contribution, in 
other words the amount that actually goes into the fund once all the relevant 
charges have been paid, since this is considered to be more suitable for 
carrying out the comparisons. 
•  In some countries the premium earmarked for invalidity and death benefits is 
collected at the same time as the charge. However, in other countries the 
contributor has to pay it separately. In addition to this, the contingencies 
covered vary from country to country. Table 2 includes a column showing the 
amount earmarked for this insurance, as well as the net charge once the 
insurance premium has been deducted from the amount.  
Table 2 shows the net charge as a percentage of the contribution, both gross (charge 
ratio, a´1) and capitalizable.  
In Bolivia a charge is also made for administering the portfolio, the ceiling for which 
is 0.2285%. The joint effect of this charge along with the original charge on contributions is 
shown in the table in brackets. In those countries marked with an asterisk the charges include 
an amount for financing watchdog committees. According to Demarco and Rofman (1999), if 
this type of charge were deducted, the differences between countries would be narrowed, 
especially in Argentina and Peru. Then again, the collection of contributions in Argentina is 
carried out by the same public service that collects taxes and which does not charge the 
administrators for their services.  
31
As far as insurance is concerned, additional information and recent data on the cost of 
these contingencies can be found in AFP-ag (2000b) and FIAP (2000). It should be pointed 
out that Mexico has the highest figure for this contingency, which is managed by a public 
organisation (the IMSS). 
A case which stands out from the rest is Bolivia, which has the lowest administration 
costs of all the reformed systems in Latin America. According to Von Gersdoff (1997), due to 
the small size of the country and in order to avoid the high commercial expenses borne by 
other countries in the area, the authorities decided to authorize only two administrators chosen 
by international public tender (Demsetz type competition) to provide a service with lower 
operating costs. Transfers between administrators were prohibited until 1 January 2000, and 
the system is expected to be opened up to new administrators in May 2002. Transfers are 
currently suspended until the merger between the two administrators already in the market has 










as % of 
wages 
Net fees 




as % of 
wages 
Net charge on 
contribution 
(charge ratio) 
gross net (a´1) 
Country 
a b  c=a-b  d  c/(d+c)  c/d 
Argentina* 3.26  1.18  2.08  7.74  21.18  26.87 
Bolivia*  2.50 2.00 0.5  10.00  4.76  (9.5)  5.0  (9.59) 
Chile 2.48  0.68  1.80  10.00  15.257  18.00 
Colombia* 3.50  1.86  1.64  10.00  14.09  16.40 
El Salvador  2.98  1.29  1.69  9.50  15.10  17.79 
Mexico
4 4.79  2.50  2.29  10.91  17.35  20.99 
Peru* 3.73  1.34  2.39  8.00  23.00  29.88 
Uruguay 2.73  0.76  1.97  12.27  13.83  16.06 
 
Source: AIOS (2002), FIAP (2001) and authors. 
 
In addition to the income they receive from individual capitalization accounts, 
administrators are also paid for managing the collective capitalization fund associated with 
                                                 
4 In Mexico, the State contributes 5.5% of the minimum wage, which is estimated as 2.2% of the average wage.   
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the Bolivida
5 subprogram, see De la Serna (2001). This implies that there is a cross-subsidy 
from the collective program towards the individual one, which would explain the low level of 
charges for contributors in comparison with other countries.  
Although the Bolivian model appears to be a valid one, Valdés-Prieto (1999) points 
out that the bidding system can also create great weaknesses due to the fact that, after their 
tender has been accepted, the winning administrators take on the role of private monopolies 
bound by tariff regulations where the tariff is the tender originally offered. The main problems 
that could arise are: 
a)  The administrator has an incentive to reduce the quality of the administration 
service in order to reduce costs and increase profits. The regulating authority can 
only avoid this happening by applying a full watchdog system to check the quality 
of the service and by being able impose sanctions without appeal to a legal process 
that would be slow and technically unable to assess the weaknesses. 
b)  The administrator has the incentive to renegotiate tariffs with the authorities. It is 
not difficult to see that one of the most tempting offers the administrator could 
make to the authority in order for it to accept an increase in tariffs would be to 
reallocate pension fund investments to those areas favoured by the authority, 
financed by low yield government bonds. The affiliate cannot escape by changing 
administrator because he has been deprived of the right to choose. The basic 
problem is that a concessionary administrator has the State as its only client and is, 
in practice, an extension of the state machinery. 
Administration costs are much higher for the affiliate in Argentina and Peru, since in 
these countries the costs of setting up the system and the lower capitalizable contribution are 
still reflected. These costs should decrease substantially over the medium and long term 
because, as the companies attract more affiliates and funds, they can benefit from economies 
of scale. It is to be expected that these benefits would be passed on to the contributors. 
Until very recently Argentina had the highest administration costs for the affiliate of 
all the new pensions systems studied, when measured as the net charge on contributions 
(charge ratio). This in spite of the fact that they have fallen sharply since the system was set 
up. The biggest savings have been made in the sales force and advertising costs. However, the 
high level of profits made by the administrators would appear to indicate that the market is 
                                                 
5 In Bolivia there is a social welfare program coordinated through two accounts: "Bolivida" and the "Cuenta de 
Acciones Populares" (CAP), managed through a collective capitalization fund and the resources for which come 
from the privatization of public companies.  
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not very competitive. Another fact that seems to support this hypothesis, see Rofman (2000), 
is that if every affiliate were to choose the cheapest administrator according to his level of 
income, the average charge for the system, including insurance costs, would fall from 3.41% 
(at the start of 2000) to 2.95%. According to Rofman (2001), various legislative measures 
have recently been approved aimed at reducing these high costs, namely: putting a ceiling on 
charges,   reducing the number of transfers per year, and assigning undecided new affiliates to 
the cheapest administrators according to their expected level of income. These measures 
would probably bring about an increase in price competition. 
Administration costs, including insurance cover, have clearly been falling. According 
to data supplied by AFP-ag (2000a), costs in Chile fell from 4.87% of salary in 1983 to 2.31% 
at the end of 2000. This decrease may be due to a combination of factors including 
experience, greater efficiency, the incorporation of new technology and rationalization of the 
transfer process. Other measures could bring about an even greater decrease: allowing 
administrators to give discounts on charges to those affiliates who do not transfer their 
individual accounts for a certain period, as has recently been allowed in Argentina, or letting 
them share infrastructures and subcontract sales staff. 
Table 3 shows the calculation of charges equivalent to an annual percentage of assets 
(a´2) for different salary functions.  
 
Table 3. 
Charges as annual % of the accumulated Fund (a´2), r=0,05. (30/06/01) 
 
Country  Exponential  Gaussian Carriere 
Years T=30  T=40  T=30  T=40 T=30 T=40 
Argentina 1.51  1.10  1.35  1.01  1.32  0.97 
Bolivia 0.62  0.45  0.56  0.42  0.54  0.40 
Chile 1.04  0.75  0.93  0.70  0.91  0.67 
Colombia 0.95  0.69  0.85  0.64  0.83  0.61 
El Salvador  1.02 0.75 0.92  0.69  0.90 0.66 
Mexico 1.20  0.87  1.07  0.81  1.05  0.77 
Peru 1.66  1.21  1.48  1.11  1.45  1.07 




Source: authors’ calculation. 
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The assumptions are: charges levied in each country as per Table 2; contributions for 
30 and 40 years; real return of 5%; and real growth in salaries of 3.18% in the case of the 
exponential function. The data for the United States is obtained from the hypothesis put 
forward by Genetski (1999), assuming that the American pensions system were to be 
transformed into a system of individual accounts as in Chile, for the fifth year of functioning. 
The data for Spain is the simple average of the data obtained by the authors themselves from a 
sample made up of 45 individual pension schemes from nine different entities. Sixteen of the 
45 schemes charge the participant the maximum authorised by law (Ley de Planes y Fondos 
de Pensiones en España), which is 2.6% on the assets managed/deposited. The equivalent 
charges on contributions (a´1), assuming contributions between 30 and 40 years, real return of 
5%, and real growth in salaries of 3.18% for the exponential function, will fluctuate between 
29.9% and 38.2%. 
It is immediately noticeable that the salary function of constant exponential growth 
overvalues the equivalent charges projected as an annual percentage of assets when compared 
to the other two salary functions. This effect has not been detected before in the specialized 
literature and, as can be seen from the data in Table 3, it overestimates the projected charges 
by up to 15%.  
Table 4 shows the charges recalculated as an annual percentage of the accumulated 
fund for each of the countries of Latin America, assuming the historic gross annual real return 
of the funds achieved from the time the system was set up is maintained. With this 
assumption, and given that the real return reached in all the countries was higher than that 
used in Table 4 (and in most countries almost double), the estimated charges decrease. It can 
also be seen that the most expensive and the cheapest countries are still the same ones, with 
the reduction in estimated charges for El Salvador standing out due to the extraordinary real 
return reached up to now. Therefore it can be appreciated that measure (a´2) is quite sensitive 
to the passing of time and to the projected real return. But which are the true estimated 
charges, those in Table 3 or those in Table 4? It would be equally arbitrary to assume that the 
same real return would be obtained in every country, or that the return obtained up to now 
will be maintained in the future, although the latter assumption would perhaps be the most 
appropriate. It is symptomatic that when most authors make international comparisons they 
project the data on charges that are applicable now in each country, yet they adopt 
assumptions of real return that make them all equal.   
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Table 4. 
Charges as an annual % of the accumulated fund (a´2) 
with projection of the historic real annual gross return of the funds (30/06/01) 
 
Country 
% historic real 
annual gross 







Argentina 10.86  1.19  0.83 
Bolivia 12.38  0.47  0.33 
Chile 10.87  0.82  0.58 
Colombia   11.92  0.73  0.51 
El Salvador  12.06  0.79  0.55 
Mexico 10.97  0.95  0.66 
Peru 5.58  1.61  1.17 
Uruguay 8.82  0.79  0.56 
 
Source: AIOS (2002), ASOFONDOS (2001), FIAP (2001) and authors  
 
 
5.2.  Charges in other countries with individual capitalization accounts. 
 
Table 5 shows the estimated charges in a number of countries outside Latin America. 
The current pensions system in Australia was set up in 1992. Although there are no 
regulations governing the structure or level of charges, according to Whitehouse (2000) there 
is usually a combination of a fee as a percentage of assets, plus a fixed charge per account 
and/or a charge as a percentage of contributions. There are two types of pension schemes: 
industry funds (collective pension schemes) and the master trust (individual pension 
schemes). As mentioned earlier, the references used are those for individual pension schemes, 
which are the most expensive in all countries, and this is the data used in Table 5. 
                                                 
6 The historic real annual gross return of the funds is since the inception of the various capitalization systems, 
except for Peru and Colombia, which is for the last 84 and 36 months respectively.  
36
Table 5. 
Estimated charges in other countries with individual accounts. 
Exponential, T=40 
Without account transfer 
Countries 
a´1  a´2 
Australia 35.5 2.09




Source: authors' calculation based on Whitehouse (2000),  Murthi, Orszag and Orszag (2000), Chlon, Gora and 
Rutkowski (1999) and Andrews (2001) 
 
 
The way the current pensions system is organized in the United Kingdom can be 
considered very complex for the affiliate, according to Murthi, Orszag and Orszag (1999), due 
to the great number of options available. This means that some affiliates, see Murthi, Orszag 
and Orszag (2000), may make very inappropriate decisions. The system is decentralized, 
privately run and voluntary. There are very strict regulations governing the sales process, 
although these do not apply to administration costs. This lack of regulation means there is a 
great variety of charges, many of which the affiliates may not understand or even perceive. 
As can be seen, administration costs in the United Kingdom are very much higher than 
in the countries of Latin America, higher even than those in Peru and Argentina. This high 
level of costs does not appear to be due to a lack of competition nor to excessive profits for 
the administrators, but rather because of the complexity of the system and the special 
regulations governing the sales process. Looking at the data it is not surprising that the 
authorities are very worried and are setting up a new type of scheme called stakeholder 
pensions, which aims to be a cheaper option for workers on low incomes than the individual 
accounts. This new option will come into effect in October 2001 and the given aim is that 
annual administration costs will not exceed 1% of the total assets administered. 
In Poland, according to Chlon, Gora and Rutkowski (1999), which has also recently 
set up a new pensions system, charges are levied on contributions and assets, but there is no 
fixed charge. The result of this is that charges are lower than in the United Kingdom and 
Australia, and also lower than those of the most expensive countries in Latin America. In 
Kazakhstan, according to Andrews (2001), where the pensions system has recently been 
reformed and a system of individual accounts introduced, regulations limit administration 
charges to a maximum of 1% on contributions, plus 10% on the return. This means that  
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charges are relatively low for the affiliates. However, the data for both Poland and 
Kazakhstan should be considered with care since the systems are still in their infancy. 
5.3.  Charges for transferring accounts and converting accumulated savings into a 
pension. 
Table 6 shows how some factors which are not usually considered very important in 
the literature undoubtedly have a great effect on estimating the costs borne by the affiliates 
during their whole period as contributors/pensioners: transferring accounts and converting the 
savings accumulated into a pension. Due to the lack of data on charges for transfers and 
conversion for each of the countries, the same charges have been applied to all of them. 
Neither of these two aspects is less worthy of consideration for that. 
 
Table 6. 
Estimated charges for transferring accounts and converting savings 
into a pension, r=0,05. (30/06/01). 
 
Exponential, T=40 
Without change of 
fund 
With a change of fund 
every 8 years (4 
changes) 
a3=0,02 
With a change of fund 
every 8 years (4 changes) 




a´1  a´2  a´1  a´2  a´1  a´2 
Argentina 21.18  1.10  24.71  1.32  28.47  1.57 
Bolivia 9.50  0.45  13.55  0.66  17.88  0.90 
Chile 15.25  0.75  19.05  0.97  23.09  1.21 
Colombia 14.09  0.69  17.94  0.91  22.04  1.15 
El Salvador  15.10  0.75  18.90  0.96  22.96  1.21 
Mexico 17.35  0.87  21.05  1.09  25.00  1.34 
Peru 23.00  1.21  26.45  1.43  30.13  1.68 
Uruguay 13.83  0.68  17.69  0.89  21.81  1.14 
 





Table 7 includes the percentage of accounts transferred in 2000 in each of the 
countries with individual capitalization accounts. In Bolivia, according to AIOS (2001), 
transfers have been suspended until the merger between the two administrators existing in the 
market is completed and another one enters. There is also a high level of transferred accounts 
in the United Kingdom according to Murthi, Orszag and Orszag (2000).  
The very high number of transfers between administrators in Chile, see Devesa and 
Vidal (2001), was historically one of the biggest problems as it meant an unnecessary increase 
in administration costs. In 2000, according to AIOS (2001), advertising accounted for almost 
28% of administration costs in Chile and over 50% in Argentina, Peru and Uruguay. In order 
to solve the problem to a certain extent, from October 1997 the Chilean authorities demanded 
additional procedures to effect transfers between administrators and limited the taking on of 
new sales staff. These measures brought about a sharp drop in the number of transfers. The 
percentage of transferred accounts reached a maximum of 76% in 1983, but was still an 
extremely high 57% in 1997. In 2001 it was 7.7%. Other countries which reformed their 
pensions systems at a later date learned from the experience of Chile and introduced measures 
to limit the number of transfers and the number of sales staff. Outside Latin America, few 
authors have tried to quantify the effect of changing funds. Murthi, Orszag and Orszag (2000) 
estimate that charges in the United Kingdom are 52% higher for those who change accounts 
every seven years than they are for those who remain in the same fund the whole time, since 
the charge ratio can rise from 21.7% to 33%. 
 
Table 7. 













         Source:  AIOS (2002) y FIAP (2001) 
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Annuities suffer from marketing problems in various countries of Latin America. In 
Chile, see AFP-ag (2000c), it is well known that annuity brokers charge a high rate of 
commission, around 7% of the savings accumulated by the affiliate
7. Current legislation gives 
some affiliates the incentive to opt directly for an annuity in order to access free disposal 
funds, which are obtained through a high rate of commission for the insurance company 
salesperson which is generally shared with the affiliate. In Argentina, according to Palacios 
and Rofman (2001), over 80% of retirees who acquire an annuity contract it from an 
insurance company with links to the administrator which previously managed the funds. In 
Colombia and Peru, markets for this type of income are still in their infancy and are less 
competitive with much more concentration.  
 
Table 8. 
% Increase in estimated charges for transferring accounts and 
converting savings into a pension. 
 
With a change of 
fund 
With a change of 
fund and conversion 
charge 
Countries 
%↑ a´1 % ↑ a´2 % ↑ a´1 % ↑ a´2 
Argentina 16.67  20.00  34.42  42.73 
Bolivia 42.63  46.67  88.21  100 
Chile 24.92  29.33  51.41  61.33 
Colombia 27.32  31.88  56.42  66.67 
El Salvador  25.17  28.00  52.05  61.33 
Mexico 21.33  25.29  44.09  54.02 
Peru 15.00  18.18  31.00  38.84 
Uruguay 27.91  30.88  55.70  67.65 
 
   Source: authors' calculations. 
 
 
The results shown in Table 6 are most revealing. Each effect has a great impact, and 
this is proportionally even more noticeable the lower the original level of commission charged 
to the contributors. To make this clearer, Table 8 shows the data from Table 6 transformed 
into increases in charges over the original figure for each country. 
                                                 
7 In the case of Poland, Chlon, Gora and Rutkowski (1999) estimate the conversion cost at 5%.  
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5.4.  Charges in Spain. 
Spain itself has been left till the end deliberately, since the level of charges the 
participants of individual schemes pay appears to be extraordinarily high when compared to 
the data used for the other countries under analysis. The main characteristics of the "industry" 
in Spain are as follows. There were 5,168,114 participants in individual schemes at December 
2001. There are currently 649 schemes of this type. The average number of participants per 
scheme is just 7,963. Other than individual schemes, there are 670,000 participants in other 
types of scheme. There are 81 administrators which manage individual schemes. The largest 
administrator has 92 individual schemes. The assets managed is much more concentrated, 
with the ten largest administrators absorbing 77%. The Herfindahl
8 index is 0.0952, whereby 
it can be considered a moderately concentrated market as far as managed assets are 
concerned. 
It is not easy to carry out an analysis of the administrators in Spain because insurance 
companies and mutual funds can also be pension fund managers. Excluding these, we have 
obtained data on 47 administrators for 1999 from the statistical and accounting documents the 
Dirección General de Seguros
9 publishes on its website (http//:www.dgseguros.mineco.es). 
The average annual return on equity (ROE) for 1999 was 36.47%. Seven of the administrators 
registered losses. The ten most profitable administrators - mainly linked to groups which 
manage greater assets - accounted for 94% of the profits of all of those analyzed, their average 
ROE being 49.50%. It may be assumed that the profits from pension fund management for 
those insurers which play a dual role could be at least as large as they are for pure 
administrators since in many cases they share infrastructures with other branches of insurance. 
The above data appear to indicate an alarming lack of competition in the market. The tariffs 
charged to participants are in no way justified and are way above the international average 
according to Tables 3, 4 and 6. It seems that the generous tax treatment of pension schemes is 
“shared” by the administrators in the form of higher charges.  
                                                 
8 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used to measure the degree of concentration of an industry. It tends 
to grow if the number of companies decreases or if just a few capture a large share of the market. It is used as an 










where Pi: assets of administrator i, and TP: total assets managed by the industry as a whole. 
9 This information was obtained on 5 March 2002. The most recent year for which data is available is 1999.  
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It appears that not all operators in the Spanish market agree with this situation of 
concentration. There is one organization
10 among those with a smaller share of the market 
which has launched a very aggressive campaign called Plan retorno to attract clients to its 
individual pension plans. Its basic draw is the establishment of cash bonuses to reward 
participants' loyalty
11, increasing from a minimum 0.2% to a maximum 0.35% of the capital 
transferred or deposited. At the same time it has incorporated into the campaign a transfer 
auction system on the internet, offered to those participants who wish to move their plan to 
the organization, where they can bid to obtain a minimum bonus of 0.2% and a maximum of 
1%. This innovative strategy, which is basically only a reduction in management charges, 
clashes with the traditional strategies followed by the larger organizations based on giving 
free gifts to those who decide to transfer their consolidated rights. Campaigns of this type 
prove that commission rates have a wide margin for reduction. 
The current level of a similar type "product", such as investment accounts, shows an 
average charge of 1.38% as a percentage of assets. The upper limit is occupied by common 
stock funds in Euros at 1.85% and the lower limit by what are known as FIAMM (money 
market investments) at 0.95%. In the year 2000, the economic authorities in Spain decided to 
lower the maximum charges levied by the administrators. Even then voices were raised in the 
specialized Spanish press in favour of reducing them further, since according to the study 
carried out by Lipper Analítical
12, the administration charges levied by Spanish administrators 
are the highest of all the countries compared, whether for fixed or variable income funds. 
However, underwriting charges and back-end fees are generally lower in Spain. 
5.5.  Some problems with the international comparison of charges. 
Making an international comparison of the administration costs of the different 
pension systems and/or the level of commission they charge their affiliates is complex and the 
results questionable, at least in the following aspects: 
a)  Differences in design and regulations, see Mastrángelo (1999), with regard 
to minimum return, collection functions and administration of additional 
resources.  
                                                 
10 Published in the financial newspaper EXPANSIÓN, pp 2 and 11, 2 November 2001. 
11 Financial organizations believe that pension plans, because of their view to the long term, are a suitable 
product for creating client loyalty, despite the fact that Spanish legislation gives participants the right to transfer 
their consolidated rights to another administrator at no fiscal or administrative cost. 
12 Published in the business supplement of El PAÍS, pages 14 and 15, 13 May 2001.  
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b)  For Valdés-Prieto (1999) the amounts of the start-up costs of the different 
systems vary a great deal and are to a large extent defined by what 
regulations govern the system from the start. Hence in Peru and Uruguay, 
for example, new workers who start working for an employer are free to 
choose between remaining in the old system or entering the new one. In 
Colombia, those workers who decide to enter the new system are free to 
return to the old one once they have been there the minimum three years. In 
Argentina and Chile, however, new workers who start work for an employer 
have to enter the new system. This ensures that in these countries the costs 
of attracting clients from the old system are not recurring but part of the set-
up costs. Finally, in Bolivia, Mexico and El Salvador the authority almost 
eliminated this source of set-up costs by making it compulsory to transfer to 
the new system. 
c)  In principle it would appear that pension fund administrators could take 
advantage of economies of scale, and so the size of the market in each 
country should establish a limit to the number of administrators, to the 





Affiliates, number of administrators and assets managed. (30/06/2001) 
Affiliates 




Total Average  Biggest  Smallest 
Argentina 1994  7.8 13 8,623,960 663,381 2,311,182  143,097
Bolivia 1997  11.6 2 655,231 327,615 343,061  312,170
Colombia 1994  5.1 6 4,150,772 691,795 1,062,088  35,084
Chile 1981 59.1 7 6,331,239 904,463 2,578,589  110,104
El Salvador  1998  4.4 3 898,725 299,575 498,825  21,639
Mexico 1997  3.6 13 22,305,802 1,715,831 5,021,676  111,563
Peru 1993 5.9 4 2,587,541 646,885 681,718  615,464
Uruguay 1996  5.1 6 586,219 97,703 220,921  33,977
 
Source: AIOS (2002), FIAP (2001) and authors. 
                                                 
13 On this aspect there are many authors who are not in complete agreement. Whitehouse (2000) finds no 
significant relationship between fees and the size of the administrator either in Latin America or the United 
Kingdom, although this does not mean that there may not be one between costs and the size of the funds 
administered, which other researchers have in fact found.  
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In Uruguay for example, as can be seen in Table 9, the number of affiliates for the 
whole of the welfare system is around 586,000 people, which is less than the number for a 
single administrator in many other countries. In fact the administration industry registered 
losses until 1999 in the smaller countries: Bolivia, El Salvador and Uruguay. In 2000 they had 
started making a proft in all three countries. 
There can also be large differences between countries that have adopted a mandatory 
system of individual accounts and those where it is voluntary. 
a)  There can be noticeable differences in the quality and quantity of the service 
provided by companies in different countries. 
b)  The charge structure does not have the same effect on all workers, the salary 
level being very important. 
c)  In the case of measuring costs as a percentage of the annual assets of the 
funds, it has been assumed that no changes are made to the charge structure 
during the whole time horizon under consideration. Going by the experience 
of Latin America, this is a very restrictive assumption.  
All this makes it difficult to carry out an international comparison of administration 
costs due to the different baseline assumptions.  
6.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 
This paper has set out a model based on the ideas of Whitehouse (2000) and Diamond 
(1999) to enable the explicit costs borne by the affiliate during both his working life and his 
retirement period to be assessed. It also shows the relationship between the different ways of 
measuring the costs that make up the total price that contributors eventually have to pay. In 
addition to this, the different charge structures usually applied to the participants of the 
pension funds can be compared. This is made possible by transforming the original charge 
structure into an equivalent single measure: 
a´1 : combines the effect of all the explicit fees as a whole into a single constant 
percentage which decreases the total amount of all the contributions made. 
a´2 : combines the effect of all the explicit fees as a whole into a constant decrease in 
gross return.  
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Assuming that it was necessary to show a single measure for assessing the 
management costs for the affiliate, the most appropriate would be determined according to the 
charge structure applied and by its relative importance. Hence for example in the case of most 
Latin American countries - those where charges payable by affiliates are levied mainly on 
contributions - the use of a´1 would be the most appropriate. In the case of Spain, however, 
the use of a´2 would be preferable due to the charge structure used. 
The basic contribution of the paper vis-à-vis the reference models used has been the 
analytical introduction of some aspects which are not usually given much importance in the 
literature but which, as has been shown, have a great effect on projecting the costs borne by 
the affiliates during the whole of their period as contributors/pensioners: the effect of account 
transfers and the changes in assumptions regarding salary profiles. Changing assumptions 
regarding salary profiles from the standard usually used (exponential function of constant 
growth) shows that converting charges levied on contributions into other equivalent charges 
levied on the fund or the accumulated assets brings about an important change in the projected 
costs for the affiliate, which can reach 15%. 
The specific application of the model to the new capitalization systems of Latin 
America leads us to reject the criticisms made by some researchers in the sense that they are 
too expensive to administer for the affiliate. These criticisms appear to be clearly 
disproportionate when a comparison is made with other countries considered more developed, 
such as Australia, the United Kingdom or Spain.  
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that there is still room for improvement - many 
countries have costs well above 1% of annual assets - and that these systems will always have 
higher costs for the affiliate than other types of capitalization account. A reduction to half the 
current level of charges levied during the accumulation phase could increase the accumulated 
value individual capitalization accounts in Latin America by between approximately 6% and 
11%. 
Another important aspect is that the projected costs for the affiliate grow substantially 
if the effects of charges for transferring accounts and converting savings into pensions are 
taken into account. The lower the level of the original costs, the higher the proportional 
growth of costs when these are included. The effect of these charges can increase projected 
costs by up to 100%, in the extreme case of Bolivia. 
As far as the second aim in carrying out the international comparison is concerned, it 
must be said that the level of charges paid by the participants of individual pension schemes 
in Spain appears to be extraordinarily high. Also the great concentration of managed assets in 
the hands of very few financial groups and the high concentration of profits within the  
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administration industry seem to point to a clear size effect and indicate symptoms of a lack of 
real competition in the market. All this leads one to think that the ceiling on charges 
authorized for the Spanish market is very high
14. It may possibly have been valid when the 
legislation governing pension schemes and funds was introduced in 1987, but today, with 
greater experience, greater efficiency and, more than anything, the incorporation of new 
technology designed for the management and administration of funds, these ceilings should 
be modified downwards and the possibility considered of encouraging loyalty or fulfilment 
discounts along the lines of those being introduced in some countries of Latin America and, in 
a very limited way, in Spain.  
                                                 
14 Fortunately it would appear that the Spanish authorities are considering a reduction in maximum commission 
rates. In a statement made to the newspaper Expansión on 19/01/2002, the assistant director for DGS pension 
plans said that, “over the next few months the DGS will be drawing up regulations for pension fund 
administrators which, amongst other things, are aimed at bringing about a reduction in current commission levels 
by introducing a system of mixed and variable commission according to the return obtained by the administrator 
and the services provided to the participants. The maximum rate of commission (2.6%) should be reduced to a 
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from which is immediately obtained: 
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whereby the total amount accumulated is: 
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DETERMINING THE VALUE OF THE ACCUMULATED 
FUND WITH ACCOUNT TRANSFERS. 
 
 
Assuming that a percentage, a3
i, is charged on the accumulated fund as a fee each time 
the account is transferred, and that in addition “s” changes of fund are made every “T/(s+1)” 
years, the total net amount accumulated (apart from the charge for converting it into income) 
will need to be deduced section by section. The contributions made up to the first change, 
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The expressions are deduced until the contributions made between the penultimate and 
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with which the sum of all the final values obtained earlier, along with the incorporation of the 
charge for conversion into a pension, can be expressed as: 
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THE GAUSSIAN AND CARRIERE-SHAND FUNCTIONS. 
 
 
A) The Gaussian Function. 
 
In this case, following Devesa and Vidal (1997), it is assumed that real salaries will 
increase with age until reaching a maximum, WM, which will coincide with the high point of 
the career, age M. From this point onwards real salaries will gradually decrease. Therefore the 
income level at age x will depend not on the initial level, but on the maximum level reached at 
age M. That is: 
   e-   W   =   W d






    [27.] 
where:  
Wx
CP:   real salary at age x for self-employed workers. 
WM:   maximum level of real salary. 
M:   age at which maximum salary level is reached. 
d:   constant parameter, which will always take on a positive value. 
 Assuming that t =“j-x” and that, in addition, “M-x”= h, with j: retirement age, then:  
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and then integrating between 0 and T: 










a r d t
d a r T
M dt e e w a c
0







) 1 (     [31.] 
 
An expression is arrived at where there is an integral which cannot be solved exactly, 
and that makes it impossible to determine the amount of administration costs analytically. 
One way of getting round this difficulty would be to use approximate methods for solving 




B) The Carriere-Shand function. 
  
The second alternative chosen is the income function put forward by Carriere and 
Shand (1998). In this it is considered that salaries increase with age, but at ever decreasing 
rates due to the merit factor being less as time goes by: 
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where: 
δ :   rate of real salary growth for each age. 
β  y λ :  constant parameters to be estimated, which will determine that part of salary growth 
linked to merit and which is assumed to decrease with age. 
The disadvantage of this function is that two parameters have to be estimated. Carriere 
and Shand (1998) estimate them using data for the United States. 
 
Assume, as in the case above, that t =“j-x”, the salary function over time is:  
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and integrating between 0 and T: 
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C) Approximation by means of a polynomial function. 
To solve the problem arising in the two cases above, it was decided to use a salary 
function that could be integrated. The polynomial function was chosen for this due to its 
versatility in adjusting to the different types of functions and the ease with which it can be 
integrated. The procedure to be followed is to first choose the type of function (Gaussian, 
Carriere, etc.) that best reflects the real or theoretical baseline data so that, later on, the 
coefficients of the polynomial that works best with the function chosen can be determined.  
   W x = bn x
n + bn-1 x
n-1 + ... + b1 x + b0     [36.] 
where: 
bs:   are the coefficients to be determined. 
n:   degree of the polynomial chosen. 
Assuming, as in the case above, that t = “j-x”, the salary function over time is: 
 W t = W0 (bn t
n + bn-1 t
n-1 + ... + b1 t + b0) = W0 φ n   [37.] 
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where φ n is the polynomial of degree “n”. 
If it is substituted in equation (4), we get: 
 c  (1-a1) W0 φ n e
(r-a2)(T-t)    [38.] 
and if we integrate between 0 and T: 
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This integral is solved (see Appendix 4) by applying the section by section integration 
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s φ n :    derived from order “s” of the polynomial of degree “n”. 
d 
s φ n(t =T):   the value for t =T of the derived order “s” of the polynomial of degree “n”. 
 
To analyze the actual effect that the change in salary profile has on the variation in 
charges, the functions used were: 
a)   Carriere-Shand. Based on a salary equal to 1 and the values of the parameters supplied 
by the authors for data on the United States, the calculation was made with the 
following fourth degree polynomial function: 
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  with an R
2 coefficient of 0.9992. 
b)  Gaussian. First of all a value for coefficient “d” was found in order to enable the same 
actual value for salaries, based on an initial unitary salary, to be obtained as was 
obtained with the previous function. Secondly, a sixth degree polynomial function was 
assigned to the function thus obtained in order to reach an analytical result. The salary 
function obtained is: 
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with an R
2 coefficient of 0.9999. 
c)  Exponential. This presents no difficulties with regard to the analytical determination of 
the value of the fund, as was mentioned in Section II. The value of exponential growth 
was calculated in order to compare it with the other functions. Based on an initial 
unitary salary, this would enable the same actual value of salaries as found in the 
previous functions to be obtained. The salary function used is: 
   e w
  t  0.0313418 E




DETERMINING THE VALUE OF THE ACCUMULATED FUND IN THE CASE OF 
A POLYNOMIAL SALARY FUNCTION. 
 
 
By using equation (39) as the basis and substituting the polynomial expression φ n by 
its value according to variable “t”, we have: 
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From this equation will be calculated, firstly, the indefinite integral. This can be solved 
section by section, making: 
u = bn t
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The new integral that appears is formed by the same exponential function as before 
(divided by a constant) and a polynomial of one degree less than the one before (the first one 
being derived from the original polynomial). The new integral will have to be solved once 
again by integrating section by section, just as was done in the first step: 
u = n bn t
n-1 + (n-1) bn-1 t
n-2 +...+ 2b2 t+ b1  ⇒ du = [n (n-1) bn t
n-2 + (n-1) (n-2) bn-1 t
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2b2] dt = d
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whereby equation (44) can be expressed as: 
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The new integral is formed by the same exponential function as before and by a 
polynomial of one degree less than the one above (the second one derived from the original 
polynomial). It will therefore be necessary to repeat the same process “n” times until the 
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